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THE ROLE OF FEDERAL POLICY IN
ESTABLISHING ECOSYSTEM SERVICE
MARKETS
LAURIE A. WAYBURN*
ANTON A. CHIONO**
ABSTRACT
The public good nature of ecosystem services has historically
frustrated their inclusion within a traditional free-market framework.
The inherent attributes of public goods—joint consumption and the
inability to exclude users—vitiate incentives for their efficient provision
and production through conventional markets.
Government
intervention typically has been necessary to correct this market failure
with respect to other traditional public goods, such as law enforcement,
national defense, and transportation infrastructure. Correspondingly,
government intervention will be requisite in correcting market failures
to supply ecosystem service public goods, such as climate regulation.
The mechanisms by which government can correct these market
failures are contingent upon the nature of the public good itself, and
range from command-and-control approaches to market incentives.
Where private good attributes are present, such as excludability and
non-joint consumption, quasi-market incentives may be employed in
concert with command-and-control strategies to supply a public good.
Climate regulation ecosystem services, especially those provided
by forests, are unique in that carbon can act as a proxy of the services
provided. Because carbon exhibits many private good attributes,
market approaches can be employed to provide climate regulation
services. However, while voluntary markets for ecosystem services

* President and co-founder of The Pacific Forest Trust. I appreciate this opportunity to
discuss the essential role that government should play in developing new markets that promote
both public trust interests and the generation of private capital based on ecosystem services. My
participation in this effort was made possible by support from the Thornton Foundation.
** Policy Analyst, The Pacific Forest Trust.
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currently exist in the United States, these are unlikely to produce an
efficient level of the ecosystem service due to insufficient demand and
the persistence of free-ridership problems. Government regulation will
be necessary to complement these market approaches, establishing
compliance markets that induce demand for ecosystem service proxies,
set standards, and foreclose on free-ridership. Many ecosystem services
are difficult or costly to measure directly, thus the government also
must establish rigorous standards and guidelines to ensure the veracity
of the proxies used. Using traditional public goods as a template,
federal policy can help create private interests in commonly owned
ecosystem services, fostering a vigorous, profitable exchange of goods
and services while providing for the restoration and maintenance of the
ecosystems that provide these services.
In the United States, natural systems currently offset roughly onefifth of total carbon emissions, largely via forest sequestration.
Maintaining and increasing this percentage is essential for the United
States to meet its climate and energy goals. Thus, the federal role in this
ecosystem service market must address both the direct goods traded
from any individual ownership (tons of emissions reductions
sequestered on a specific parcel of land) and the larger ecosystem
(forests and other natural lands) that provide context and stability for
the function of that parcel.
The federal government must establish policies mandating that:
1. The underlying regulatory structure of the markets
established via “cap and trade” legislation includes forest and
other land sequestration as part of that system;
2. The “rules of the game” for the offset and trading market
recognize that biological carbon regulatory compliance units,
or RCUs (as opposed to voluntary offsets), are integrally
dependent upon the ecosystem that provides them; and
3. There is investment in securing the natural infrastructure of
land that provides the basic “factory” producing these
ecosystem services to the market.
I. INTRODUCTION
To establish ecosystem markets, the government must develop
systems to reconcile the often opposing forces of markets and the
public trust. Ecosystem markets are distinguished by the fact they
provide private goods, such as carbon emission reductions, that are
premised on sustaining public goods, such as the climate regulation
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services provided by forest ecosystems. While largely voluntary in
the United States to date, ecosystem service markets are unlikely to
fully achieve the goals of either the market or the public good without
federal structuring and standards. Federal policy can help create
private property interests in commonly owned ecosystem services,
fostering a vigorous, profitable exchange of goods and services while
providing for the restoration and maintenance of the ecosystems that
provide these services.
The advantages of using markets in combination with regulatory
approaches to achieve public policy goals have emerged more clearly
in the last two decades. Voluntary ecosystem service markets must
evolve and adapt to a quasi-regulatory approach if the goals of both
public policy and the market are to be fully realized. The federal role
in this quasi-regulatory approach includes many of the same essential
functions and partnering as other private-sector economies, such as
law enforcement, transportation, education and energy. It also
includes the establishment of standards to maintain the systems that
provide these goods and services. Where ecosystem services arise on
private lands, federal partnerships with the private-sector are key to
the success of ecosystem markets. Government investment must be
made in the development of the production capacity of these goods
and services. Standards and guidelines regarding the services to be
provided must be defined by the government to both reduce market
risk and ensure consumer safety, but also to ensure that these take
into account the viability of the ecosystem from which these services
spring, not just the private service or good itself.
Of the various ecosystem services for which private market
mechanisms are likely to prove effective, those relating to global
climate stabilization hold considerable promise. In the United States,
natural systems currently offset nearly one-fifth of total national
1
emissions, largely via forest sequestration.
Maintaining and
increasing this percentage is essential if the U.S. is to meet its climate
goals. Tons of carbon emissions reductions can be used as a
convenient proxy measurement for targets in achieving climate
stabilization. Thus, the federal role in this ecosystem services market
must address both the direct goods traded from individual ownership
(tons of emissions reductions sequestered on a specific parcel of land)
and the larger ecosystem (forests and other natural lands) that

1. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990–2007 ch. 7 ¶ 24 (2008).
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provide context and stability for the function of that parcel.
More specifically, in order to realize the value of the ecosystem
service of climate regulation, the federal government must establish
policies mandating that:
1. The underlying regulatory structure of the markets
established via “cap and trade” legislation includes forest and
other land sequestration as part of that system;
2. The “rules of the game” for the offset and trading market
recognize that biological carbon regulatory compliance units,
or “RCUs” (as opposed to voluntary offsets), are integrally
dependent upon the ecosystems that provides them; and
3. There is investment in the natural infrastructure that
provides the basic “factory” producing these ecosystem
services for the market.
In the first area, “cap and trade” legislation (be it trade, dividend
or other) must fully include the role of natural systems as both
essential actors for sequestration and sources of emissions. The
legislation must also require accurate accounting for the transfers of
carbon tons within and between emissions sectors that are linked,
such as forests, which sequester carbon, and energy or transportation,
which may utilize wood as a fuel source. Lastly, legislation must
require accounting systems that reflect the carbon flows transmitted
to or sequestered from the atmosphere, regardless of whether these
are from capped (energy) or uncapped sectors (natural systems).
Emissions reductions from natural systems should be fully tradable
with those from other sectors once the accounting requirements, and
the definitional and quality requirements noted below, are met.
In the second area, the essential role of the federal government is
in defining the quality standards for a ton of emissions reductions
such that these are fungible across all sectors. While much progress
has been made in defining basic standards for voluntary offsets, such
2
as with the Climate Action Reserve, those for regulatory compliance,
RCUs, will only be defined as regulatory programs such as
3
California’s AB 32 become established. These RCUs will be used to
meet any regulatory cap established to help stabilize climate, thus it is
essential that they meet not only metrics for carbon within a specific
site, but also reflect that such carbon tons are derived from sustained

2. CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, FOREST PROJECT PROTOCOL 2–3 (Version 3.1 2009).
3. CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2009).
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ecosystems that will endure sufficiently to meet climate stabilization
goals over time.
The third proposed role for the federal government is a
traditional one that involves sharing the cost of developing new
markets, especially lowering the cost of capital by partnering to invest
in necessary infrastructure development.
Here the federal
government should invest in securing and restoring the “factories” of
ecosystems that provide essential sequestration services. This would
be parallel to investments in the energy sector in which the
government shares in the costs of building new physical
4
infrastructure, such as generation facilities.
Given the major
bifurcation in federal and private land ownership in the United
5
States, investment should be tailored to each ownership type and the
threats to sequestration connected to each ownership type. The
investments should be directed at addressing those threats. Hence,
on federal lands, investments for climate should be focused on
restoration that will maintain resilient, adaptive ecosystem carbon
stocks. On private lands, federal investment should be helping
prevent conversion of forests, especially via conservation easements.
This will maintain the forestland base and the basis for sequestration.
Overall, federal investment in ensuring the sequestration services of
both public and private lands should be commensurate with the value
of the net emissions reductions these lands provide.
This paper investigates the role of federal policy in establishing
ecosystem service markets, focusing specifically on the establishment
of markets for the climate change mitigation benefits conveyed by
forests. It reviews the underlying economic theory behind the historic
market treatment of forests and the services they provide, and uses
this as a basis for elucidating the role of government in establishing an
ecosystem service market for forest carbon. Part II introduces the
science behind forests and climate change, and the ways in which
forest management regimes can render forest ecosystems as either an
asset or a liability with respect to global climate change. It addresses
the services forests provide and investigates the manner in which
these services have or have not been incorporated into traditional
market frameworks and the implications of such treatment. Part III

4. Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market
Initiatives are Insufficient to Improve the US Energy Infrasatructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
327, 347–48 (2007).
5. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., GTR-NC-241, FOREST RESOURCES OF THE
UNITED STATES, 2002 at 3 (2005).
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explores the economic theory behind the provision and production of
traditional public goods while Part IV uses this as a basis to inform
future strategies for maximizing the climate services afforded by
forests. Finally, parts V and VI draw upon the preceding analysis to
articulate the role of the government in establishing an effective,
robust ecosystem service market for forest climate benefits.
II. FORESTS AND CLIMATE
The warming of the global climate system has been recognized
from observations of increased global average air and ocean
temperatures, melting of snow and ice, and a rising global average sea
level. Most of the increases in global average temperature since the
mid-twentieth century have been attributed to rapidly increasing
concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Between 1970
and 2004, annual emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important
6
anthropogenic greenhouse gas, increased by 80 percent. Global
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other
anthropogenic greenhouse gases have been increasing in the
atmosphere since 1750, and now far exceed the atmospheric
concentrations preceding industrialization. Unless strategies are
pursued to abate emissions and mitigate atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases, a changing climate will increase the risk of
7
disruption to ecological, social, and political systems across the globe.
U.S. forests play an integral role in global climate regulation by
reducing net greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere. Together, the
public and private lands that compose our domestic forests sequester
and store about one-fifth of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
8
annually. Despite the tremendous value our forests provide in
9
stemming climate change, their continued ability to furnish these
carbon sequestration services is not guaranteed, and in many cases is
10
being undermined by a variety of market forces and public policies.
6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Groups I, II, and III to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, ¶ 36 (Nov.
2007) (prepared by Rajendra K. Pachauri & Andy Reisinger).
7. Id. at 37.
8. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. supra note 1, ch. 7 ¶ 24 (2008).
9. R.K. Dixon et al., Carbon Pools and Flux of Global Forest Ecosystems, 263 SCIENCE
185, 188 (1994).
FOREST-LAND
10. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., PNW-GTR-797
CONVERSION, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES FOR POLICY: A REVIEW 3
(2009); Christopher L. Lant, J.B. Ruhl & Steven E. Kraft, The Tragedy of Ecosystem Services,
58 BIOSCIENCE 969, 974 (2008).
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U.S. public and private forests vary considerably in terms of
ownership objectives, management histories, and current forest
11
conditions. As a result, each faces a related, but unique, suite of
challenges that threaten their continued ability to sequester and store
carbon.
A. Climate Duality of Forests
Forests have a dual role with respect to climate. As stated
earlier, forest ecosystems sequester and store vast amounts of carbon
when conserved, providing an important service in the regulation of
12
global climate. Conversely, when forests are disturbed, the carbon
stored within these ecosystems is emitted, releasing greenhouse gases
13
into the atmosphere. Further, the consequences of forest conversion
are not simply a discrete, one-time release of greenhouse gases into
14
the atmosphere. In addition to the emission of the biological carbon
stored within forest ecosystems, conversion also sacrifices the future
15
sequestration capacity of these ecosystems. Hence, the conversion
of forests both increases the quantity of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere, exacerbating global climate change, and undermines our
16
ability to remove these gases from the atmosphere in the future.
Indeed, the historic clearing of global forests has vastly reduced our
current global forest area, and is responsible for nearly 35 percent of
17
total anthropogenic carbon emissions in the atmosphere today.
Over 1.5 million acres of private U.S. forestland are lost to
conversion and development annually, thereby emitting the biological

11. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FS-874, INTERIM UPDATE OF THE 2000
RENEWABLE RESOURCES PLANNING ACT ASSESSMENT 28–29 (2007).
12. Dixon et al., supra note 9, at 188–89.
13. Kurt S. Pregitzer & Eugénie. S. Euskirchen, Carbon Cycling and Storage in World
Forests: Biome Patterns Related to Forest Age, 10 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 2052, 2052
(2004).
14. William R. Emanuel & George G. Killough, Modeling Terrestrial Ecosystems in the
Global Carbon-Cycle with Shifts in Carbon Storage Capacity by Land-Use Change, 65 ECOLOGY
970, 978–79 (1984).
15. Andreas Fischlin et al., Ecosystems, Their Properties, Goods, and Service, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTIONS OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 211, 221 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Jeanine M. Rhemtulla et al., Historical Forest Baselines Reveal Potential for Continued
Carbon Sequestration, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6082, 6082 (2009); see also R.A. Houghton,
The Annual Net Flux of Carbon to the Atmosphere from Changes in Land Use 1850–1990,
TELLUS 51B, 298 (1999).
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carbon stored in these ecosystems and sacrificing the future
18
sequestration potential of these lands. Over the next half century,
this trend is expected to continue, and an additional 50 to 75 million
acres of private forestland are projected to be lost to conversion and
19
development.
While afforestation and reforestation efforts may
offset some of this loss, the climate benefits of newly planted forests
cannot begin to replace the vast carbon storage and sequestration
20
potential forgone when mature forests are converted.
As a
consequence of earlier land use patterns on private lands, many
forests are now characterized by younger stands, which store far less
21
carbon than mature forests. Allowing these forests to grow older
will result in substantially greater stores over time, if they are allowed
22
to remain as forest.
Public forests, while composing roughly one-third of the total
U.S. forestland, store substantially more carbon per acre on average
than do private forests. These public forests are the cornerstone of
the United States’ ability to combat climate change through biological
23
sequestration. However, with the exacerbation of forest stressors
posed by a changing climate, public forests and their attendant carbon
24
stocks are also at increasing risk of disturbance and emission.
Ensuring the ongoing robustness and resilience of public forests, and
capitalizing on the vast untapped carbon storage potential of the
remaining private forestlands, which account for nearly 60 percent of
25
all domestic forestlands, will be critical to addressing climate change.
B. Ecosystem Services
The carbon sequestration provided by our nation’s forests is an
example of an ecosystem service. Ecosystem services have been
18. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FS-874., supra note 11, at 20 (23 million acres
converted between 1982 and 1997, or 1.5 million annually).
19. See id. at 5.
20. Sebastian Luyssaert et al., Old-Growth Forests as Global Carbon Sinks, 455 NATURE
213, 213 (2008).
21. See Jeanine M. Rhemtulla et al., supra note 17, 6082.
22. See id.
23. Richard Birdsey et al., Mitigation Activities in the Forest Sector to Reduce Emissions
and Enhance Sinks of Greenhouse Gases, in U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., RMRSGTR-59, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AMERICA’S FORESTS: A TECHNICAL
DOCUMENT SUPPORTING THE 2000 USDA FOREST SERVICE RPA ASSESSMENT 112, 112
(2000).
24. Constance I. Millar et al., Climate Change and Forests of the Future: Managing in the
Face of Uncertainty, 17 ECOLOGY APPLICATIONS 2145, 2149–50 (2007).
25. See e.g., Jeanine M. Rhemtulla et al., supra note 17, at 6084–85.
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broadly defined as the processes of ecosystems that directly or
26
indirectly support human wellbeing. These services may be grouped
into four broad categories according to the functions they perform:
27
regulation, habitat, production, and information functions.
Regulation functions relate to the capacity of ecosystems to regulate
essential ecological processes, such as the regulation of global climate,
through bio-geochemical and biospheric processes. In addition to
maintaining ecosystem and biosphere health, regulation functions
provide substantial direct and indirect benefits to humans, such as
28
clean air, water, soil, and biological control services.
Habitat
functions refer to the services ecosystems offer in the provision of
refuge and reproductive habitat for flora and fauna, the conservation
29
of evolutionary processes, and biological and genetic diversity.
Production functions pertain to the creation of ecosystem goods
through photosynthesis and nutrient uptake by autotrophs. These
functions create a wide variety of carbohydrate structures, many of
which provide goods for human consumption, ranging from food to
30
raw materials to energy resources. Information functions refer to
the maintenance of human health that ecosystems offer through the
provision of opportunities for recreation, cognitive development,
31
aesthetic experiences and spiritual enrichment.
While all of these services are important, regulation functions are
essential to a healthy, functioning biosphere, and are therefore
necessary for the maintenance of all other ecosystem functions. In
the context of climate change, the regulation functions provided by
the atmosphere and ecosystems like forests are of critical importance
to the overall health and functioning of the global biosphere.
Because the maintenance of global climate is a regulation function,
the diminishment of climate services through the continued
concentration of atmospheric carbon has implications for the other
32
ecosystems functions contingent upon climate regulation.

26. See, e.g., Marc Levy et al., Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current State and
Trends, 1 ECOSYSTEMS & HUMAN WELL-BEING 123 (2005).
27. Rudolf S. de Groot et al., A Typology for the Classification, Description and Valuation
of Ecosystem Functions, Goods, and Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 393, 394–95 (2002).
28. Id. at 396–97.
29. Id. at 395.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 396.
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C. An Intersection of “Tragedies”
While production functions generally result in the creation of
discrete, easily commoditized ecosystem goods, such as timber and
mineral resources, regulation functions provide services that are less
concrete in nature, and do not lend themselves to ready
quantification or exchange in the traditional marketplace. As a
result, conventional markets often fail to efficiently and costeffectively support the services arising from regulation functions,
leading instead to the degradation and destruction of these services in
33
The market failure of forest
favor of production functions.
ecosystem services is even more unique, however, because it falls at
the intersection of two distinct environmental “tragedies”: A lack of
internalized positive and negative externalities.
1. The “Tragedy of the Commons”
Degradation of the global climate is a classic example of Garrett
34
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons.” While Hardin’s definition of
the “commons” has since been clarified as actually describing “openaccess” resources, this seminal work has catalyzed the analysis of
market failure in the context of common-pool resources such as the
35
atmosphere. The “tragedy” to which Hardin referred was that of an
open-access resource, where property rights to moderate resource
36
usage were poorly developed or non-existent. This is distinct from a
commons, which refers to a property rights regime that determines
the rules by which a community may access and use a common-pool
37
resource. In the absence of common property laws, a common-pool
resource like the atmosphere becomes an open-access resource,
which can be exploited to collapse. This destruction is the inevitable
outcome Hardin describes as resulting from the “remorseless working
38
of things.”
Open-access resources are characterized by non-excludability
and subtractability. The first characteristic, that of non-excludability,
refers to the difficulty inherent in excluding users from an open-

33. Franz W. Gatzweiler, Organizing a Public Ecosystem Service Economy for Sustaining
Biodiversity, 59 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 296, 298–99 (2005).
34. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243–48 (1968).
35. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
36. Id.
37. Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 969.
38. Hardin, supra note 34, at 1244; Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 969.
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access resource. The second characteristic, subtractability, refers to
the diminishment (or subtraction) of value that the exploitation of an
40
open-access resource by one user incurs for other users. Emitting
carbon is an example of using an open-access resource, namely, using
the atmosphere as a waste receptacle.
Because of the amorphous nature of many ecosystem services,
quantification of value in reliable, discrete terms is often difficult.
This frustrates the ability to clearly define property rights governing
the use of an environmental resource, and the subsequent assignment
of pecuniary value to harms and benefits associated with its use.
Without a defined value or property right, excluding users or holding
them accountable for their use can be difficult or impossible.
Consequently, conventional markets are unable to accurately account
for the costs and benefits associated with open-access resources, and
41
tend to fail with respect to an efficient allocation of resource use.
2. Externalized Costs
Though the parties responsible for using an open-access resource
may not incur the costs of their resource use, their actions certainly
do have costs. Currently, society at large bears these costs in the form
of reduced air quality and a disruption of global climate regulation
services. These externalized costs, or negative externalities, are borne
by outside parties while the resource user exclusively enjoys the
42
benefits derived from the externality-inducing activity.
In the
absence of regulation, emitters may freely use the atmosphere as a
medium to dispose of waste emissions. The atmosphere as an openaccess resource exhibits partial subtractability in this respect; when
one group of users utilizes it as a repository for waste emissions, its
utility may be diminished for other uses. Society at large, which relies
on the atmosphere as a resource to maintain air quality and provide
key ecosystem services like climate regulation, finds these other use
values marginalized by excessive emissions. Yet, because the

39. Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices, in:
POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES (Michael D. McGinnis, ed., University of
Michigan Press 1999).
40. Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting The Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284
SCIENCE 278, 278–79 (1999); OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39; Thomas Dietz et al., The
Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907, 1907 (2003).
41. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 577–84
(1996).
42. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 174, 183–188 (Macmillan and Co.,
4th ed. 1932) (1920).
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externalized costs of greenhouse gas emissions are currently omitted
from the economic calculus of individual emitters, the market dictates
43
overuse of the resource as a waste-storage medium. As a result,
even if the costs society collectively bears in terms of reduced air
quality and diminished climate regulation exceed the individual
benefits emitters enjoy, there is no incentive to limit emissions
because the responsible actors only bear a fraction of the social
marginal cost.
Consequently, markets are unable to achieve
allocative (Pareto) efficiency in the face of externalities, thereby
44
failing to maximize total social welfare and leading to market failure.
45
Hardin’s tragedy is that of externalized costs.
3. Externalized Benefits
While the tragedy of open-access resources articulated by Hardin
arises from the externalization of each user’s cost of using a resource,
externalities are not limited solely to the unaccounted costs of an
46
activity.
The failure to internalize external benefits, or positive
externalities, of an activity within the cost calculus has been
recognized as leading to a related, albeit distinct, type of market
failure. Where positive externalities occur, the beneficiaries of a
service enjoy that service without compensating those responsible for
47
its production. Ecosystem services are a classic example of the type
of benefits markets fail to provide efficiently. Due to the often
amorphous nature of ecosystem services and the difficulty in
quantifying them, their benefits frequently are externalized from the
economic calculus. In an encomium to Hardin’s seminal thesis, the
consequent underproduction of the services arising from this market
48
failure has been described as the “tragedy of ecosystem services.”
This tragedy is that of externalized benefits.
Forestland management decisions are unique in that they occur
at the intersection of these tragedies, creating both positive and
negative externalities with regard to global climate.
Forest
ecosystems sequester carbon when conserved and emit carbon when

43. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1991).
44. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348–49
(1967).
45. See Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 970.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 971.
48. Id.
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converted, meaning that forests can act either to the benefit or
detriment of the global community for climate regulation. However,
because private landowners currently have no means by which to seek
recompense for the carbon sequestration their lands provide, society
currently is able to “free-ride” on these benefits, enjoying their value
49
but not sharing in the costs of their production. Correspondingly,
just as these positive climate externalities are not currently included
in the cost calculus of forestland management, neither are the
negative externalities arising from forest management. When forests
are overharvested, or converted and developed to other uses, the
carbon stored in these ecosystems is emitted to the atmosphere,
contributing to global climate change and the tragedy of open-access
resources that befalls the atmosphere. Society collectively bears the
costs of these actions in the form of heightened levels of atmospheric
carbon and diminished biological carbon sequestration capacity while
the landowner enjoys the exclusive benefits that accrue from these
actions.
D. Averting Tragedy: Correcting Market Failure
Correcting these market failures turns on the ability to bring
externalized costs and benefits to bear on the parties responsible.
Even in the absence of clearly defined property rights, such as is the
case with open-access resources, negotiation can yield an
50
economically efficient allocation of resources. Bargaining among
affected parties can allow externalized costs to be included within the
economic cost calculus, resulting in an internalization of costs and
allowing the free market to dictate an efficient outcome regardless of
51
each party’s liability.
However, arriving at an efficient outcome
requires the negotiation of each party affected, a proposition that
includes costs. As the number of affected parties increases, the
administrative costs involved in negotiation between all necessary
actors may quickly become prohibitively expensive. Even when all
parties can be brought to the table, rent seeking and other strategic
behavior can vastly inflate the costs of negotiating an optimal
52
outcome. Additionally, there may be little incentive for responsible

49. See Trista M. Patterson & Dana L. Coelho, Ecosystem Services: Foundations,
Opportunities, and Challenges for the Forest Products Sector, 257 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT.
1637, 1639 (2009).
50. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1960).
51. See id. at 7–8.
52. See id. at 20.
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parties to voluntarily enter into negotiations to internalize costs that
53
would otherwise remain externalized. Due to the foregoing factors
as well as costs associated with the subsequent policing and
enforcement of such agreements, the negotiation of an optimal
agreement may become very costly for private actors to undertake.
These collective costs are termed “transaction costs,” and may exceed
the benefits derived by internalization, leaving affected parties little
54
choice but to bear these externalized costs. In instances like climate
change, where externalities affect a global constituency, the sheer
number of stakeholders overwhelms the ability of collective
bargaining to achieve resolution, and some degree of government
55
intervention is necessary to correct this market failure.
E. Private and Public Goods
1. Private Goods
Because the climate costs and benefits of forest management
have yet to be monetized, they continue to be externalized from the
56
economic calculus.
As a result, the market can be expected to
induce private forestlands to overproduce activities that create
negative climate externalities and underproduce activities that create
positive externalities. Because forest landowners generally receive no
compensation for the production of regulation functions, their lands
are often developed to produce goods with clear, monetized market
benefits. These items are the result of the production function
57
services provided by ecosystems, and are known as private goods.
Private forest goods include traditional commodities, such as timber
and property development, and are characterized by excludability,
which refers to the ability to control the use of a good or resource,
and subtractability, which denotes the diminishment in value one user
58
incurs for all other users of the resource. These characteristics allow
private goods to be valued readily and easily exchanged in the
marketplace.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Esty, supra note 41, at 591.
Demsetz, supra note 44, at 349.
See Esty, supra note 41, at 638, 652.
See Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 972.
OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 77–78.
Id.
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2. Public Goods
In contrast to private goods, climate regulation and other
ecosystem services cannot be easily quantified or monetized for ready
inclusion within the marketplace. The benefits derived from these
services are neither easily excludable nor subtractable; rather, the
carbon sequestration benefits forests provide are enjoyed by all of
society through the maintenance of a well-regulated climate. Items of
59
this nature are termed public goods. While demand exists for the
provision of public goods and the protection of the public trust, the
inability to exclude users and extract compensation for the
production of a public good means that no incentives exist for the
market to produce these goods. The dedication of lands to the
production of private goods is further perpetuated by an inherent bias
in U.S. common law against leaving land in an undeveloped state,
deterring any remaining incentive for property owners to manage
60
their lands for the provision of ecosystem services. This arises from
an inherent utilitarian premise in common law that the development
of resources invariably puts land to better and higher use, thereby
61
maximizing social welfare. This results from the law’s premise that
the value of best possible land use options will be reflected accurately
62
in monetary terms. Beyond merely disincentivizing the retention of
ecosystem services on private lands, common law correspondingly
offers few options to redress those harmed from the loss of ecosystem
services. Because ecosystem services are not recognized under
common property law, beneficiaries have no legal recourse when
63
these services are lost. As a result, governments must intervene to
correct the market’s failure in providing traditional public goods, such
as public education, national defense, law enforcement, medical
research, national transportation infrastructure, or the establishment
of natural reserves such as parks, national forests or wildlife refuges.

59. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 75–76. Public goods were first formally
described by Paul A. Samuelson in The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387, 389 (1954).
60. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 590 (1996).
61. Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 972.
62. Id.
63. J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, 108–109 (2007).

Wayburn_final_PD edt.doc

400

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

7/30/2010 4:43:58 PM

[Vol. 20:385

III. ORGANIZING PUBLIC ECONOMIES
Goods and services are generally conceived of as occurring on a
spectrum of excludability and subtractability.
Those that are
perfectly excludable and subtractable are termed pure private goods,
while those that are perfectly non-excludable and non-subtractable
64
are described as pure public goods.
In reality, most goods and
services occupy a position somewhere between these extremes.
These characteristics are important in determining the most effective
means of providing and producing a particular good or service. Items
that tend to be more reminiscent of pure private goods are easily
provided for and produced by the market. Conversely, as items
become more of a public good in nature, they become increasingly
more difficult to provide through traditional markets. Because the
exclusion of users is infeasible for public goods, markets for these
goods break down on the demand side, where users are unwilling to
pay for something that freely accrues to them. Cost-minimizing users
have little incentive to contribute their share to supplying a good
65
when they can continue enjoying it free of cost. Even if voluntary
efforts to produce the good exist, the persistence of this free-ridership
problem means that voluntary efforts are unlikely to produce a
satisfactory amount of the public good.
To compensate for the market’s inability to produce public
goods, some form of collective action is necessary whereby
beneficiaries are induced to pay their proportionate share for the
production of the good while sanctions can be used to foreclose on
free-riders. Because no market demand exists for a non-excludable
public good, government intervention is needed to induce the supply
66
of this good through the creation of a collective consumption unit.
Collective consumption units are authoritative entities established to
provide demand for a public good and levy compulsory assessments,
taxes or user charges to ensure beneficiaries provide their
proportionate share in the production of the public good. An
appropriate collective consumption unit is designed to include the
beneficiaries of a public good within its boundaries while excluding

64. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 77.
65. Id. at 80–81.
66. Id. at 83.
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those who do not benefit.
Once established, collective consumption units must make
decisions over the provision and production of the good or service.
Provision choices refer to the decisions over whether to provide the
good at all, while production specifications refer to the actual
68
processes involved in the creation of the good. Provision decisions
affect the type, quantity and quality of goods and services furnished
to the public, the type and degree of private regulation necessary, and
the amount and type of revenue to be raised (e.g., taxes, bond
69
Once these decisions are established, the production
measures).
aspect, or the actual technical processes by which the goods and
services will be made, must be specified. Unlike private goods, where
the price conveys information about the demand for that good, taxsupported expenditures convey little about the beneficiaries’
preferences—except their willingness to comply with tax laws rather
70
than face incarceration. Consequently, collective consumption units
must create alternate means of articulating user preferences over the
provision of a public good.
Once the provision decisions are made regarding the type and
quantity of a public good to be supplied, a production unit must be
established to aggregate technical factors of production to meet the
provision specifications articulated by the collective consumption
unit. The organization of a production unit may occur in a variety of
arrangements.
A collective consumption unit might vertically
integrate and operate its own production unit (e.g., a municipality
71
with its own fire or police department).
Alternatively, it might
contract with external private vendors in the production of the public
good (e.g., a municipality that contracts with a private firm for snow
72
removal services). In another scenario, a collective consumption
unit might not organize a production unit at all, but, rather, establish
service standards for the provision of a public good and relegate
discretion for the production of that public good to consumers (e.g., a
municipality that licenses refuse collection firms, but leaves it to the
73
consumer to choose a private vendor and purchase service). Where

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Esty, supra note 41, at 587–597.
OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 86
Gatzweiler, supra note 33, at 300.
OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
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a collective consumption unit does not establish an in-house
production unit, the organization of a public economy may
encompass multiple autonomous parts, comprising various levels of
74
government, private enterprises and voluntary associations. Under
such circumstances, the government itself does not serve individual
citizens. Rather, public goods are produced by a variety of different
public service industries, such as the police industry, the education
industry, the water industry, the fire protection industry, the welfare
industry, the health services industry, the transportation industry, and
others. While the role of the government will vary in the production
unit of each public-service industry, most will have important private
components.
Organizing the provision and production factors of ecosystem
public goods, however, differs from that of traditional public goods.
Here the choice to provide an ecosystem service typically does not
need to be made; it is already provided by the ecosystem. Thus, the
provision decision entails determining of whether to continue
providing the good through the maintenance of the ecosystem that
75
produces it. However, in contrast to traditional public goods, the
provision decisions governing ecosystem public goods often are not
directly made by a public body. Rather, the amount and quality of a
particular ecosystem service is dictated by the management decisions
made on the lands that provide it. This means that the decision of
whether to provide a public service largely remains in the hands of
76
private resource managers. This is indeed the case concerning U.S.
forests, where private landholdings compose more than half of all
77
domestic forestland. Further complexity is inherent, due to the fact
that ecosystem services are provided across ecosystems, which span
property and political boundaries. Thus, decisions regarding the
provision of ecosystem services must transcend political boundaries to
be made at the scale in which they operate.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING MARKET FAILURES
The tragedy of open-access resources is a failure to account for
negative externalities, while the tragedy of ecosystem services is a
failure to internalize positive externalities. The emerging challenge

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 87–88
Gatzweiler, supra note 33, at 300.
Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 972.
See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., INTERIM UPDATE 2000, supra note 11, at 27.
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then becomes internalizing these costs and benefits within the
economic calculus to correct the failure of the market to prevent
resource use that perpetuates both tragedies. Correcting these
market failures will necessitate the internalization of both
externalized costs and benefits, and will require: (1) inducing the
provision of a public good when the provision decisions and factors of
production largely are privately controlled; and (2) the creation of
disincentives for activities that cause climate harm through the
emission of carbon. Government has traditionally played the role of
correcting these market failures, and will again be critical to doing so
in the context of forests and climate.
Governments can approach the correction of market failures in
several ways. The policy instruments for achieving environmental
objectives are typically bifurcated into two categories: regulatory,
“command-and-control” approaches, and market or incentive-based
78
mechanisms.
Regulatory approaches provide firms with little
flexibility, specifying compliance strategies for achieving a rigidly
79
defined environmental benchmark. In contrast, market strategies
provide firms with incentives to achieve a sustained level of
environmental progress and offer great flexibility in compliance
80
approaches. Under a purely regulatory regime, desired behavior is
specified through a command-and-control approach, and compliance
standards and methodologies are explicitly defined by a regulatory
body. Alternatively, market regimes take steps to valuate and
monetize ecosystem benefits and harms previously externalized,
allowing policymakers to harness the market in correcting behavior.
Disincentives are created to internalize the costs of socially
undesirable behavior while externalized benefits are recognized and
monetized to incentivize desirable behavior.
Historically,
environmental policy has utilized both of these approaches, or,
81
depending upon the particular scenario, a combination of the two.
The advantages inherent to market approaches over commandand-control policies have long been described, and include efficiency,
transparency, cost-effectiveness, and the ability to foster investment

78. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
79. Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155 (1988).
80. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental
Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 465 (1992).
81. See id. at 465–67.
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82

and innovation. Unlike command-and-control approaches, where
behavior is mandated, market approaches allow individual firms to
select an appropriate level of environmentally desirable behavior.
Rather than specifying required behavior via external bureaucratic
directives, market strategies retain operating decisions in the hands of
those who are best qualified to make them—the affected firms.
Under a market strategy, each firm is enabled to pursue its most costeffective level of environmental progress, equating abatement costs
on the margin and achieving a given level of environmental quality
83
for the least cost. While this latitude in compliance means that
market approaches may not be as suitable for threshold damage
functions with highly localized damages, market-based approaches
are particularly suited in instances where more uniform mixing of
pollution occurs over larger geographic areas, such as in climate
84
change.
The most effective approach depends on the nature of the good
or service to be provided. In instances where the organization of a
public economy has private good attributes, a quasi-market scheme
can be developed in concert with more traditional regulatory
schemes.
Regulations can be used to establish regulatory targets, program
rules and enforcement mechanisms while a market framework can
allow for efficiency in complying with these targets and create
incentives for regulated entities to go beyond mere compliance
obligations. This approach has been the basis for sulfur dioxide and
85
nitrous dioxide markets established under the Clean Air Act. Both
the market reward and the regulatory punishment are critical to the
success of these markets, as one reinforces the other and clear
enforcement provides certainty and demand.
Additional financial mechanisms, such as subsidies, grants and
tax measures also can be used to correct incentive alignment and
induce desired behavior, complementing the regulatory and direct
market approaches. The ownership pattern of private forestlands is
such that, for the climate market, such mechanisms may be essential
to correct the market preference for large suppliers. Over 10 million
private parties own forestland in the US, but only about 9,000 of them
82. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 155; see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 78, at 171.
83. See Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential
Savings from Market-Based Policies, 23 J. REG. ECON. 43, 49 (2003).
84. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 80, at 465.
85. Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1995).
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have properties totaling 10,000 acres or more. In such cases, prior
experience shows that shifting small landowner behavior toward
providing public goods (such as for habitat or water quality) have
87
been largely effected through grants and subsidies.
V. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
That some vein of government intervention is necessary to
correct the market failures affecting forests and climate change has
certainly been established above. The specific means that the
government must take, however, must still be discussed. To correct
these market failures, the role of the federal government will be
tripartite, and will require:
Inducement of demand for carbon through the underlying
regulatory structure of the markets via cap-and-trade legislation that
includes forest and other land sequestration as part of the system;
Definition of the “rules of the game” for the offset and trading
market, including a definition of biological carbon compliance units
that recognizes the integrity of the ecosystem in which they are
embedded; and
Investment in the foundational infrastructure that provides the
basic services necessary to bring these “ecosystem services” to
market.
A. Establishment of National Emissions Targets
The public good nature of ecosystem services has historically
frustrated their provision through traditional markets. Given their
amorphous nature, the difficulty in quantifying, valuating and
monetizing these services obstructs their ready inclusion in the
88
market. Climate regulation is the most likely to prove amenable to
the type of quantification and valuation that will allow monetization.
The quantity of carbon contained within a forest ecosystem is
relatively straightforward to determine. Forest growth rates can be
used to determine carbon sequestration, while levels of carbon

86. Brett J. Butler, Family Forest Owners of the United States, 2006, in Gen. Tech. Rep.
NRS-27 at 55 (2008).
87. See Patrick Sullivan, et al., The Conservation Reserve Program: Economic Implications
for Rural America, Agric. Econ. Report No. 834 (2004).
88. See generally, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT 1–5 (2004) (noting the difficulty in calculating the level of taxes, subsidies and
other environmental programs necessary to capture the true cost of pollution).
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89

storage can be calculated from the total volume of on-site biomass.
90
Thus, carbon may act as an accurate and easily quantifiable proxy
for the climate regulation services provided by forests, and therefore
allows inclusion within a market framework. Inventorying extant
carbon and then monitoring the flux of carbon in and out of a forest
ecosystem can allow for an accounting of the positive and negative
91
effects of forest management on the climate regulation ecosystem.
This would provide a basis for incorporating climate considerations
into forest management decisions. Despite the ready quantification
of carbon, its value in climate regulation has yet to be incorporated
into the economic calculus beyond incipient, voluntary carbon
markets. While voluntary markets have been assistive in the
development of inchoate carbon markets, a lesson stressed by
economists is particularly apropos: consumers are unlikely to pay for
92
something they can get for free.
Consequently, voluntary
approaches like donations or non-compliance offset markets have
93
resulted in an undervaluation of carbon.
While carbon may present a strong, albeit imperfect, proxy for
the incorporation of forest climate regulation services into the
market, this by itself does not induce demand for carbon as a good.
For public ecosystem goods whose enjoyment is related to the
consumption of a private good, such as the protection of watersheds
for the provision of clean water, externalized costs and benefits
related to the public good can be internalized into the price of the
private good for which clear demand already exists (e.g., payments to
landowners protecting watershed lands financed via a tax levied on
94
the cost of drinking water). Because the enjoyment of the benefits
of forest climate regulation are not associated with the pre-existing
consumption of a private good, they remain un-excludable, and
89. ZACH WILLEY & BILL CHAMEIDES, HARNESSING FARMS AND FORESTS IN THE LOWCARBON ECONOMY: HOW TO CREATE, MEASURE, AND VERIFY GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS
56–57 (2007).
90. While carbon itself can provide a proxy for the climate benefits conveyed by a forest
ecosystem, a proxy is by nature a simplified indicator. The climate benefits forests afford
depend on a complex, ecologically resilient ecosystem; protocols for quantifying forest climate
benefits must include parameters that account for the ecological integrity of ecosystems, not
merely coarse quantities of carbon.
91. See ZACH WILLEY & BILL CHAMEIDES, supra note 89, at 55–57.
92. B. Kelsey Jack et al., Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services: Lessons from
Previous Experience with Incentive-Based Mechanisms, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9465, 9468
(2008).
93. Id.
94. See id.
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therefore lack demand even when quantification is possible.
Consequently, compulsory mechanisms for demand generation are
95
necessary to valuate and create a market for carbon.
Congress is currently in the process of considering several
different pieces of legislation to create compulsory mechanisms for
96
carbon demand generation. These mechanisms would internalize
the climate harms caused by carbon emissions through the
establishment of a national cap on emissions that contribute to global
97
climate change. This policy would limit, or “cap,” the total amount
of emissions allowable from the U.S. economy, and require emitters
to purchase carbon emission allowances for the emissions they
98
produce. The level of the emissions cap would be controlled simply
by the quantity of allowances made available.
In contrast to a purely command-and-control strategy, a cap-andtrade approach leverages the ability of the market to achieve
emissions reductions at the least cost by allowing firms to equate
99
compliance costs on the margin. Cap-and-trade enables emitters to
comply with an emissions cap either by undertaking emissions
reductions in-house, or by purchasing emissions allowances from
other entities. Firms would be expected to reduce emissions in-house
until the marginal cost of abatement exceeded the price of a carbon
emission allowance—at which point carbon emission allowances
would be purchased to cover the remainder of emissions.
By allowing allowance trading and the participation of entities
not included under the cap in the creation of emissions reductions, a
cap-and-trade regime enables those with the lowest abatement costs
to reduce emissions. This produces incentives for entities to innovate
new and more effective means of creating emissions reductions—
incentives that would not exist if a purely command-and-control
approach had been taken. Under a cap-and-trade regime, demand
for activities that sequester and store carbon, such as forest
conservation, could be used to compensate landowners for the
previously externalized carbon sequestration value of their land.
Incentivizing these activities would induce the provision and
production of public ecosystem service goods, such as the climate
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009); The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S.1733, 111th Cong. (2009).
97. See id. § 311, et seq. (HR 2454).
98. See id. § 311, et seq. (HR 2454).
99. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 80, at 464–465.
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regulation benefits of forests, where decisions are under private
management. Further, influencing the ecosystem service factors of
provision and production through incentives, rather than regulation,
is far more politically tractable than command-and-control regulation.
This is because landowners are much more likely to embrace financial
payments for the provision of these services, and a market approach
to influencing behavior on private lands is far simpler than a
regulatory approach, where federalism reserves primary regulatory
100
land use for state and local governments.
B. Establishment of Program Rules
By definition, public goods are inherently difficult to quantify
and monetize. This characteristic has inhibited their inclusion in the
101
marketplace and resulted in their subsequent underprovision.
Finding methods by which to include these ecosystem service benefits
within the market can assist in correcting this market failure. In many
respects, climate regulation is unique from other ecosystem services
in that carbon can be used as an indicator of the climate regulation
services provided by a particular ecosystem. Biological carbon may
be quantified with relative ease, providing a means for valuating and
including climate regulation ecosystem services within a traditional
market framework. Forests and other carbon emissions sectors that
can produce credible emissions reductions above a business-as-usual
baseline may be incorporated into the market through the creation of
a carbon “offset” program that monetizes ecosystem climate
102
benefits. These offsets would provide guaranteed carbon emission
reductions, and could be used for compliance in lieu of emission
allowances under a cap-and-trade program. Because offsets are
premised on a reduction of atmospheric carbon functionally
equivalent to the emissions they counteract, offsets are theoretically
fungible with allowances. As a result, emitting entities may use
offsets for compliance without eroding the integrity of the overall
emissions cap.
While carbon offers a suitable private good proxy for some
measure of the public good climate regulation services provided by
forests, carbon itself is only a proxy, which is, by its nature, a
100. Blake Hudson & Erika S. Weinthal, Seeing the Global Forest for the Trees: How US
Federalism can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT. RESOURCES POL’Y RES.
353, 353 (2009).
101. OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 81.
102. See Patterson & Coelho, supra note 49, at 1640.
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103

simplified indicator of a much more complex system. For example,
forests maintain local environmental conditions through a variety of
services, such as increased precipitation, greater moisture retention,
104
and the moderation of spring runoff, all of which impact climate.
These are not reflected in the quantity of carbon, per se, that is
embedded in the forest. Further, the climate regulation services
provided by individual forests are embedded in a larger, integrated
forest ecosystem that is acted upon by a variety of endogenous and
exogenous drivers. Forest ecosystems are not static and are subject to
a suite of disturbance and regenerative processes, the exact nature of
105
which is contingent upon the ecosystem itself.
Management that
seeks only to maximize gross quantities of carbon without heeding the
overall health, resilience and integrity of the larger ecosystem itself
misses this point. Managing solely for the maximization of forest
carbon in the shorter term without providing for the broader
ecological integrity of the forest ecosystem is ultimately likely to
106
heighten the forest’s susceptibility to disturbance. This, in turn, will
lead to attendant carbon emissions, resulting in the erosion of the
overall climate regulation services offered by the forest ecosystem
itself. As a result, while quantifying carbon flux in an ecosystem
provides a measure of its overall effect on climate regulation, carbon
alone is not an effective proxy unless certain parameters of the
ecological health can be included in the quantification of carbon
within that ecosystem. Simply put, managing forests for climate does
not mean management for carbon and vice versa.
Accordingly, while the use of carbon offsets is an important step
toward internalizing the climate regulation services ecosystems
provide, carbon is only an indicator of the climate regulation forest
ecosystems provide. Parochial policies that narrowly focus on carbon
miss this broader point, and demonstrate a fundamental lack of
understanding of the climate regulation services ecosystems
107
provide.

103. See Margaret A. Palmer & Solanges Filoso, Restoration of Ecosystem Services for
Environmental Markets, 325 SCIENCE 575, 575–76 (2009).
104. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, 603 (2005).
105. See Virginia H. Dale et al., Climate Change and Forest Disturbances, 51 BIOSCIENCE
723, 723–34 (2001).
106. Susan M. Galatowitsch, Carbon Offsets as Ecological Restorations, 17 RESTOR. ECOL.
563, 567–568 (2009); Palmer & Filoso, supra note 103, at 575; see also Constance I. Millar et al.,
supra note at 24, 2146–47.
107. See id.
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This reality of forest ecosystems signifies the necessity of
acknowledging the complexity of the ecosystems in which biological
carbon is bound, and viewing these systems holistically rather than
narrowly in the production of carbon units.
Valuating carbon on forestlands will require assurance as to the
quantity of carbon sequestered and the durability, or permanence, of
its storage. For carbon sequestration from forests to indeed offset
carbon emissions, the government must establish program rules to
guarantee the credibility of forest and other biological offsets. These
standards must take measures to guarantee the authenticity of carbon
reductions marketed as offsets, and require that the offsets are of high
quality, are additional to what would have occurred absent the offset
program, are permanent, and are verifiable by an external, third-party
verifier. Establishing rigorous rules of exchange and enforcement will
be critical to reducing the uncertainty surrounding an offset program
and inducing investment. While often thought of as a collaborative
venture between the government, emitters and landowners, it is
important to recognize the critical role the government must play
from an enforcement perspective. From a game theory perspective,
environmental trading is akin to a three-way, non-cooperative game,
in which self-interested buyers and sellers of environmental credits
have incentives to collude against the public interest in the
diminishment of quality standards, and therefore, decrease their costs
108
of doing business.
Consequently, the government must establish
rigorous accounting protocols to protect the public interest and
ensure the climate credibility of a carbon offset program.
C. Investment in Infrastructure
Both private and public forests are important providers of
ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration. However, as these
forests operate under different ownership regimes and management
objectives, maximizing the climate benefits of these respective
ownerships will require correspondingly distinct solutions. As such, a
common, but differentiated approach will be needed to maximize the
provision and production of carbon storage benefits from both
private and public forests. The potential of these lands to reduce
atmospheric carbon must be recognized, and investment in these
lands should be commensurate with our level of investment in

108. Dennis M. King, Managing Environmental Trades: Lessons from Hollywood,
Stockholm and Houston, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 1317, 1320 (2002).

Wayburn_final_PD edt.doc

Summer 2010]

7/30/2010 4:43:58 PM

FEDERAL POLICY IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS

411

reducing emissions in other sectors, such as energy.
1. Private Forests
As noted above, the federal government has traditionally helped
bear the cost of developing private markets that serve the public
good, as with the development of the national road system, dams, and
109
power plants on which myriad private businesses depend. In each
case, the government has largely, if not entirely, borne the costs of
developing and maintaining the physical infrastructure upon which
many private commercial enterprises rely. Funding to lower the cost
of capital is made available through grants, low-cost loans and various
110
subsidies such as tax and production credits. Fundamentally, there
is a public-private partnership to develop these markets, with the
public capital bearing the costs of establishing, and in some cases
maintaining the basic shared infrastructure and the private capital
111
bearing the costs of producing the finished goods for market. This
same role is essential in the development of ecosystem service
markets: the public capital should partner to bear the cost of ensuring
the physical land infrastructure is intact, and the private capital,
through the carbon market, should bear the cost of developing and
ensuring the additional emissions reductions.
In this case, the shared infrastructure is that of land, especially
forests, which cuts across public and private borders in the production
of essential services. With three out of every five acres in the lower
112
forty-eight states owned by private owners,
the sharing of
infrastructure costs is especially pertinent, as these acres are subject
113
Without
to enormous threat of conversion and degradation.
investment at a scale beyond what individual owners can provide,
these ecosystem services will decline and disappear due to the
fragmentation and degradation of the overall system upon which they
depend.
As the value of development out-competes that of
maintaining land in a more natural and productive state, parcelization
and conversion eat away at the landscape, resulting in the proverbial
death by a thousand small cuts. As this occurs, the possibility of
109.
110.
111.
112.

OSTROM & OSTROM, supra note 39, at 87–89.
See Jack et al., supra note 92, at 9465.
Thomas Dietz et al., supra note 40, at 1909.
RUBEN N. LUBOWSKI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION
BULLETIN NO. 14, MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at v (2006).
113. See SUSAN M. STEIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PNW-GTR-636, FORESTS ON THE
EDGE: HOUSING DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICA’S PRIVATE FORESTS 5 (2005); accord FOREST
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 11, at 5.
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hitting climate targets, not to mention the disappearance of any
additional contribution to emissions reductions of renewable fuels,
declines steadily. The United States is then forced to find other
means to provide these reductions at significant, and normally great,
114
expense.
To ensure that forest and other natural lands maintain current
stores and have the capacity to increase them, the federal government
should provide an investment parallel to that for the development of
alternative and efficient energy plants: grants, low cost of capital and
tax credits. In a time of federal deficits and stringency, investment for
the conservation and restoration of more natural habitats will need to
be tied to the overall climate policy and coordinated with existing
related programs, such as those under the U.S. Department of
Agriculture; the U.S. Forest Service; the Natural Resources
Conservation Service; and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Funding should be derived from a set-aside of allowances and the
proceeds from the auction thereof and at a level at least
commensurate with the funding being established for the prevention
of international deforestation. Or, more rationally, in an amount that
compensates for the provision of sequestration services or the
production of alternative, renewable woody biomass energy. This
would argue for an allowance allocation of between five and twenty
percent for the acquisition of conservation easements on private lands
to maintain their sequestration services, and for grants to fund
restoration activities on public and private lands. These “restoration”
grants would cover costs of resilience restoration and adaptive
management, such as thinning, fire risk management and
reforestation. In turn, such activities would generate significant
employment in rural resource dependent communities. Investments
in natural lands management, primarily forestry, are in fact the most
115
leveraged of any job investment that the country can make. That is,
they bring not only climate and other ecosystem service benefits; they
are also major economic stimulants for job creation and retention.
Overall, the federal government must develop institutional
frameworks that shift from a narrow management focus on private
lands to a more holistic management approach. It must also build
institutional capacity to conduct complex ecological, social and
114. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB.
NO. 2931, THE POTENTIAL FOR CARBON
SEQUESTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 19–20 (2007).
115. See HANS HOOGEVEEN ET AL., DESIGNING A FOREST FINANCING MECHANISM
(FFM): A CALL FOR BOLD, COLLABORATIVE & INNOVATIVE THINKING 18–19 (2008).
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economic analyses to facilitate regulatory decisions in a transparent
116
Effective federal climate policies must address the
manner.
substantial loss of private forestlands to conversion and development
each year as well as acknowledge the implications these losses have
for our future ability to combat climate change. The development of
a rigorous carbon offset program in concert with a mechanism for
compulsory demand generation to accurately valuate these carbon
offsets will provide landowners with an important new source of
income for the provision of climate services.
Indeed, with the majority of U.S. forestlands being privately
owned, this approach will position private landowners in a position of
unique global competitiveness to attract investment in emissions
reductions, providing additional economic return from the investment
made by the federal government in the basic natural physical
infrastructure. Private lands will provide the bulk of increases in
sequestration services for future reductions in emissions (as they are
the most depleted in comparison with public lands) while also helping
117
maintain the base of current sequestration.
2. Public Forests
Though the majority of U.S. forestlands are privately held, public
lands are also an important source of carbon storage and
sequestration. Federal forests currently compose about a third of all
forested land in the United States, while another tenth is under state
118
or other public ownership. However, the exacerbation of stressors
and existing disturbances through climate change is increasingly
threatening the carbon sequestration and storage capacity of these
119
federal lands.
Government investment must target restoration of
the ecological integrity of federal lands to ensure the resilience and
durability of the climate benefits they afford.
The budgeting processes used by the Forest Service have also
contributed to the climate change risks faced by federal forests.
During the appropriations process, negotiations with the Secretary of
Agriculture, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress focus
largely on funding for budget line items that are particularly
120
controversial or economically important.
When the finalized
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Lant, Ruhl, & Kraft, supra note 10, at 973.
See Birdsey, supra note 23, at 117–21.
See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. supra at note 11, 27.
See Rhemtulla, supra note 25, at 6083.
V. ALARIC SAMPLE, THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS ON NATIONAL
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budget is returned to the Forest Service, it often bears little
resemblance to the budget proposal initially submitted. Production
goals and associated funding predominately focus on commodity
resource programs with tangible, easily measured outputs, while goals
and objectives for non-commodity resource programs can fall by the
wayside.
The hybrid budgeting approach used by the Forest Service was
reinforced by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
121
Planning Act of 1974 (“RPA”). The RPA was enacted in the 1970s
after “increasing public criticism of the Forest Service for its forest
122
management practices such as clear cutting.” The RPA directed the
Forest Service to develop a long-range, strategic plan for the goals
and objectives under which the national forests were to be managed.
During the late 1970s, the RPA served as the basis for the annual
budget development process, and required forest supervisors to
submit at least one budget alternative that responded to the goals
123
articulated under the RPA program.
This enabled the Forest
Service to emphasize non-commodity forest management practices in
their budget requests.
Increasing appropriations to forest
management activities were attributed to the RPA program’s ability
to highlight these activities in the annual appropriations process, as
well as the Carter administration’s overall commitment to non124
commodity production goals. However, any apparent influence the
RPA program goals had on the annual appropriations process quickly
vanished with the Reagan administration. Despite the multiple use
goals of the RPA program, appropriations for many resource
programs sharply declined while the budgeting emphasis drastically
125
To ensure that federal
swung toward commodity production.
forests are able to provide critical ecosystem services such as carbon
sequestration, budgeting processes must reflect the substantial noncommodity value of forests and provide funding for sustaining them.
The allocation of emission allowances and income from the auction
thereof, as noted above, should serve as the source of such budget

FOREST PLANNING, 15–16 (1990).
121. See Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93378 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 1601).
122. V. Alaric Sample, Resource Planning and Budgeting for National Forest Management,
52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 339, 340 (1992).
123. Id. at 341.
124. Id. at 342.
125. Id. at 343.
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revenues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate regulation by forests should be the first global scale
ecosystem service to be monetized through and in the private
marketplace. Government policy that sets appropriate targets for
reducing carbon emissions through cap and trade is essential in
creating market demand and the standards to control it. Equally,
federal policy must recognize that the sequestration of carbon by
forests alone is an incomplete recognition of forest climate regulation.
Program rules, such as those for the definition of regulatory
compliance units of forest carbon, must include ecosystem function
parameters. Federal policy must also recognize that the markets
alone are insufficient to pay for climate services. To fully realize a
forest carbon market and achieve national climate goals, federal
investment will be needed in the natural physical infrastructure of
forests—investment in a manner comparable to that for developing
the physical infrastructure essential to meeting our national goals for
alternative energy and transportation.

